Peace to end Peace

— The Trianon Peace Treaty in quotations —

The British ratification of the
Peace Treaty of Trianon revisited

Warnings and Predictions by Viscount Rothermere

The origin of Hungary's multinational ideals

Quotations assembled by Yves de Daruvar

Personal convictions of John Flournoy Montgomery

Clémenceau:
"The peace treaties are yet another means to continue war"

Bratianu
Prime Minister of Rumania
in the Rumanian Parliament on 1st July, 1920:
"We cannot rest until we totally ruin the Hungarian people economically and militarily, because while there is even a spark of vitality left in Hungary, we cannot feel secure."

Viscount Rothermere:
"The new boundaries had no justification, whether ethnographic, geographic or economic. They set up in Central Europe a permanent condition of inconvenience, friction and discontent which, if it is not remedied, must inevitably lead to another war."

Lord Montagu of Beaulieu:
"There was a saying at the beginning of the War that it was a war to end war. I think so far as the Central Empires are concerned, if I may parody that saying, that this is a ***peace to end peace."***

Compiled on behalf of
the Hungarian Council of New South Wales
by Endre Csapó for the
Federal Council of Hungarian Associations in Australia and New Zealand

The unshaded area shows the extent of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Area of Hungary with Croatia: 325,411 km². Population: 20,886,500.

Mutilated Hungary after the Trianon Treaty 1920—1938, and from 1945. Area: 92,833 km². Population: 7,606,900.

Introduction

One out of every three Hungarians lives outside the present borders of Hungary. How did this come about? At the end of World War I the victorious powers reorganized Central Europe, creating new states ("Successor States") with new borders. This happened 75 years ago, on the 4th June, 1920, when Hungary, under duress, signed the Treaty of Trianon (a palace near Paris).

Hungary's agreeing to sign this treaty was the condition imposed by the Allies for recognizing her sovereignty, albeit over just one third of its pre-war territory. Although the Western leaders who drew up this peace treaty maintained the importance of the principle of national self-determination, when the new borders were drawn up the populations in the areas concerned were not consulted, there were no plebiscites and no bargaining in Paris. Therefore, Hungary was faced with the choice of accepting humiliating losses of territory or complete annihilation as a state.

At the time of the peace settlement the treatment meted out to Hungary was justified on the following grounds: **first**, that the idea of self-determination of all nations had to be adhered to; **second**, that the nation states established in place of the Habsburg Empire had to be economically viable; **third**, that boundaries in that part of Europe had to be militarily defensible **and lastly**, that the future stability of the area had to be assured as far as possible.

It seems, however, that the peacemakers used these principles only when they worked to the disadvantage of Hungary.

The doctrine of the self-determination of nations was only applied to make sure that as few non-Magyars were left to Hungary as possible. Many important regions were taken away from Hungary to assure the economic viability of the successor states, while no one cared if these losses permanently disrupted the Hungarian economy. Strategically defensible borders were drawn only where their establishement served as a justification for detaching additional Magyar populated regions from the country. The argument for the need to assure future stability in East Central Europe was adhered to only when it resulted in the further weakening and disarming of Hungary. At the same time the prospect of internal peace within the successor states was dangerously prejudiced by the inclusion of large Magyar and other minorities in each of them.

The Peace Treaty was imposed on the Hungarian people under conditions which, in fact, meant the continuation of the state of war. Indeed, as Clémenceau put it, "*...another means* to continue war". However, this type of war differed from the one the Peace Treaty terminated. For Hungary, the war ended with unconditional surrender. Then the second stage of war began by *"another means"*. This second stage has been in force for 75 years with some variations. One third of the Hungarian nation lives almost as prisoners of war on their land of birth, which the successor states received as spoils of war, and they treat them accordingly. In order to perpetuate the splendid historical experience they regard the liquidation of their Hungarian minority populations as a patriotic commitment.

The quotations given in the following pages are only a small part of all that is available concerning this very unusual peace treaty. However, these quotations fully reveal the sort of settlement the Treaty of Trianon is, following which there can be no reconciliation even after 75 years.

The Hungarian Question in the British Parliament

Extracts from a book with the same title published by Grant Richards, London in 1933.

In the Introduction Roland E. L. Vaughan Williams K. C. writes:

This collection of speeches made in the House of Lords and the House of Commons at various times between 1919 and 1930 concerning Hungary has been delivered, and was published, with the object of helping public opinion to come to a just conclusion as to the Treaty of Trianon and its consequences.

No one will to-day seriously deny that the Treaty of Trianon violated the principle of self-determination. Three and a half million Hungarians were left outside Treaty Hungary, forming in several instances solid "blocks" immediately adjoining the new frontier. In recent years the principle of self-determination has fallen into some discredit, but it was the principle which the Allies invoked during the war and on which the peace treaties were avowedly based. It was applied rigorously whenever it told against Hungary, but subordinated to other considerations whenever it told inconveniently in favour of Hungary. Can it be said that the course actually taken has created a satisfactory state of things?

As a palliative to this violation of the doctrine of self-determination, the Minority Treaties were insisted on by the Great Powers at the Peace Conference. They were a condition of the transfer of territory to the Succession States. In the case of the territories detached from Hungary the racial "minorities" included not only Magyars but also Saxons and Swabians. All these races are today united in protesting that the Minority Treaties have failed to secure for them elementary justice.

I do not think any fair-minded person who has gone at all into the merits of the question will today deny that some **revision** of the Trianon Treaty is **imperative**, not only in the interest of peace and justice but also for the safety of Europe.

Viscount Bryce, House of Lords, December 16th, 1919:

The Paris Conference has been unfortunate in endeavouring to keep secret its proceedings from the peoples of the Allied countries. Had they been known, protests would have been heard from the peoples of at least some of the Allied countries, because some of the decisions which have been arrived at by the Paris Conference are likely to have unfortunate results.

There is a district in Eastern Transylvania, which I visited many years ago, inhabited by a branch of the Hungarian nation who have been established there more than a thousand years.

They are very simple, honest, mountain folk, living all by themselves, and having no Rumanian mixture. To take these people and subject them to the Rumanians, who are alien in religion, language and race, would be a grave injustice. I desire and hope that whenever the boundaries come to be limited the case of these particular Magyars will be carefully provided for, and that they will not be put under the Rumanian dominion. I have already observed that the Magyar population has reached a higher level than that of the Rumanian. The civilization of the Rumane people and of Rumania is on a distinctly lower level than that of the civilization of the Magyars in Hungary, and therefore it would be a "come-down" for the population of Hungary to be ruled by those who would come as officials from a less educated and less advanced country such as Rumania.

I do not believe that if a large population is taken away from Hungary and placed under the Rumanian Government that the Hungarians would tamely acquiesce in it. ...

Lord Newton, House of Lords, February 25th, 1920:

I cannot refrain from pointing out that in some respects Hungary seems to have suffered more than any other country that participated in the War. It is proposed by the Treaty to diminish her territory by two-thirds; it is proposed to take away most of the big towns; the population will be reduced from something between 17 millions and 18 millions to little more than 7 millions. Hungary will lose nearly all its minerals and its ores, more than half its corn- and maize-producing districts; it will lose a great portion of the horse- and cattle-breeding districts; and worse than all, between 3 millions and 4 millions genuine Hungarian Magyars will be transferred to alien countries without having any chance whatever of pronouncing an opinion on the subject. I venture to think that of all the belligerents against whom we contended, Hungary is the one which should make the greatest appeal to our sympathy. Hungary never wanted war. ...

Captain Elliot, House of Commons, March 25th, 1920:

These new boundaries which are being set up cannot stand, and in many cases they should not be allowed to stand. The only hope is that in this Treaty we have set up what no Treaty has had before — a permanent court of revision by which these things can be discussed in prudence and not in passion, in the cold light of reason and not in the light of burning roofs and burning stack-yards. The mere boundaries of Hungary are impossible. They are ridiculous. No such boundary has ever been seen in the world. ...

The Rumanian frontier includes a Magyar community which is planted right in the frontier of Hungary, a sort of Hungarian Ulster, and if you realise what would happen if you put Ulster under the rest of Ireland just now you would have a faint conception of what is happening in this community where you have a similar number of people put under a rule alien in religion and in culture. ...

Lord Newton, House of Lords March 30th, 1920:

What has become of the question of so-called self-determination? Why should millions of civilised human beings be handed over like so many sheep or cattle without being allowed to express any opinion at all. Why should these people not be allowed a plebiscite as has been allowed in other cases?... But what makes the position almost intolerable for these unfortunate people is that they are surrounded by a ring of hostile States.

Lord Montagu of Beaulieu, House of Lords, March 30th, 1920:

It was brought home to me very much that the old Austria-Hungary was a state of mixed and sometimes antagonistic races, but it had at any rate an economic unity. Now the four countries into which it has been divided have their own national flags and a new autonomy, whereas under the old system they were all one.

There was a saying at the beginning of the War that it was a *war to end war*. I think so far as the Central Empires are concerned, if I may parody that saying, that this is a ***peace to end peace***. ...

Lord Sydenham, House of Lords, March 7th, 1921:

My Lords, I agree with every word which has been uttered by the noble Lord (Newton). I regard the case of Hungary as one of several great tragedies of the Peace, the effects of which will endure when the War tragedies have passed away. After a territorial unity of, I think, nearly a thousand years Hungary has been suddenly deprived of two-thirds of her area, and outside that new Hungary is some of the best blood of Hungary, distributed arbitrarily among one new State and two States newly enlarged. I am certain that this people will never permanently submit to the alien rule under which they have been placed. It was stated, I think, by the Government that there would be a Commission of Inquiry which would delimitate finally the frontiers, and which would take into consideration racial distinctions. I do not know whether that has been done, but I feel certain that the map of Europe cannot possibly remain permanently as it now stands.

The Peace Conference seems only to have taken into account the economic necessities of the countries which it carved out of the map of Europe. Hungary is not only cut off from many of her finest sons, but deprived of territory necessary to her existence, and of some great railway centres which I believe to be her right. But that is not all that Hungary has suffered. As the noble Lord has pointed out, from March 21st to August 1st, 1919, Hungary was subjected to a most appalling Red Terror carried out by Bela Kun and his brother alikes. The outrages they committed, faithfully imitating their confederates in Russia, were shocking to the last degree; and the curious thing is, that we heard nothing of the Red Terror. But as soon as there was a revolt of Hungarians against these shocking atrocities, Europe and America were treated to a strong propaganda directed against the so-called White Terror. And that is why Hungary is friendless. I trace it entirely to the

very powerful and very expensive propaganda which was carried on. ...

Then followed the irruption of the Rumanians into Hungary. When they retired they carried off pretty nearly everything upon which they could lay their hands, and left a great many Hungarian farms absolutely devastated. ...

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy, House of Commons, April 20th, 1921:

If the framers of this Peace Treaty are so satisfied with its boundaries, it seems to me to be a very great mistake that they did not agree to adopt the plebiscite for its determination. If it is right to hold a plebiscite for Schleswig-Holstein or for the determination of the frontiers of Upper Silesia, it is equally right to hold one for the frontiers of Hungary.

I wish to point out to the House that this Peace Treaty which we are asked to pass this afternoon creates some half-dozen Alsace-Lorraines on the frontiers of Hungary, if the information we get is correct. If it is incorrect it could have been proved by a plebiscite, and I say one should have been held.

I wish particularly to draw the attention of hon. Members to one or two of the areas where real injustice has been done, and may I in doing so say that I share my hon. and gallant Friend's indignation at the action of the present Hungarian Government? All my sympathies are with the subject races emancipated from the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. But in drawing the frontiers we must not allow our prejudices and our sentiments, our likes for this people, our sympathy for that people or our dislike of other people to in any way mould our actions in laying down these new frontiers. I will first draw the attention of hon. Members to the case of the district of Pressbourg (as Bratislava became capital of Slovakia) on the Danube and of Érsekújvár. This, as hon. Members may be aware, is territory predominantly inhabited by Magyars. It has been handed over to the new Czecho-Slovak State in order that it should have a riparian frontier on the Danube... I trust, too, that this historic State of Pressburg, with its normal Magyar population and old associations with Hungary, will not be handed over to alien rule. ...

There is another very bad irredenta in the Kassa—part of the northern frontier, partly composed of Magyars and partially of Slovaks. There is a solid block of 300,000 or 400,000 Magyars with a little interspersion of other races, who are mostly German. I think the Slovak frontier has been drawn too much in favour of the Czecho-Slovakian States, and I contend that a plebiscite should have been taken there. ...

The hon. Gentleman did admit that there seemed to be hardship to the Szeklers (Transylvanian Hungarians) in this matter. There you have an island with a Magyar population which has been incorporated in Rumania. I admit that the difficulties there are very great. There seem to me, however, to have been two alternatives which might have been followed. One was to run a corridor from Kolozsvár area and the other was to allow the Szeklers to remain in the Hungarian Kingdom. I admit there would have been great economic difficulties in doing that, but I think it would have been better if these unfortunate Szeklers could have been given autonomy. As my hon. and gallant Friend said, these unfortunate people have been most harshly treated by the Rumanians. The University of Kolozsvár has been closed up, the professors driven away, and the students dispersed. ...

I think that a much larger measure of ***autonomy*** might have been given to the Magyar-inhabited regions in Transylvania. The district of Szatmár has been handed over, although I believe it is premominantly Hungarian.

I do not want to spend any more time on these irredentas, except that I think a real case has been made out for a plebiscite. If a plebiscite is not taken, the Magyar people will always be discontented, and many thousands of people —I have seen the figure put at 3 million Magyars— will be groaning under the sense of injustice at being bartered away like so many cattle to alien rulers. ...

There is one further objection which I must take to the Treaty in justifying my vote against it. To realise these facts fully it is necessary to take a map of Hungary showing the railways, and to put on it a tracing showing the new boundaries; and also to take other maps showing the waterways and the roads and other communications, and put similar tracings on them, and, if possible, on other maps showing the physical features of the country — the mountains and so on. It will then be seen that the new frontiers completely cut across the whole economic life of the former Hungary... At these new frontiers there is all the paraphernalia of customs, prohibitions, anti-dumping regulations, and fiscal measures of all sorts, and trade is absolutely stopped. It was not sufficient to allow these people in their new territories complete fiscal freedom and to give them *carte blanche* to cut off the trade of their neighbours. They are injuring themselves and each other. I feel that those who drew up this Treaty paid too much attention to the political aspect and too little to the economic aspect: and this is not the only Treaty in which that difficulty is visible. ...

Captain Elliot, House of Commons, April 20th, 1921:

Nothing surprises me more than the mood of the House of Commons this afternoon. We are doing a **great injustice**, and we are coolly going to shoulder our responsibilities on to the Paris Conference which committed sins in the heat of the War that we now propose to ratify in the cold light of reason. ... It fills me with fear and trembling to think that some day our destiny may be adjudicated on by such a tribunal as this which is to-day adjucating on the destinies of Hungary. ...

The short discussion we are having this afternoon will probably end in the ratification of this instrument which is supposed to settle the destinies of Eastern Europe. It was said long ago, and it is as true to-day as ever it was, that nothing is ever settled unless it is settled right. This is one more nail in the coffin of that wicked policy of *self-determination* which has done so much harm throughout Europe in the past few years. It swept Europe like a blast of pestilence, and the end has not come yet. This idea of self-determination always seems to me to be urging a race which is getting on very well under one set of people to come out and subject itself to the rule of another set of people. Why speak of self-determination to the Serbs, the Rumanians and the other peoples in Hungary? These people came into Hungary to avoid the Turkish storm that was sweeping up from the South, breaking every State and

enslaving every State. The Serbs came into Hungary when the Serbian power had been broken at the great battle of Kossovo in 1389, and they came in as suppliants, crying, "Let us in or we perish." They were let in and given their religious freedom and allowed to live in this country, and now we say that because they have been allowed to live in peace they are to be allowed to set up customs barriers and seize the land of their benefactors. Could any injustice be more horrible? Could anything be more calculated to disturb the future of Eastern Europe than that we should sanction such a grave injustice as this? ...

By this Treaty we are flying in the face of the manifest facts of nature, which will come back on us in spite of all the Acts of Parliament that ever were passed. It is only a year and a half ago that I was in Hungary, in Budapest, during their General Election there. I was there the day the Peace Treaty terms came back from Paris, and I hope never to see such a sight again. There was every shop window with the Hungarian colours in it, and a great bow tied across them, every house flying a black flag, every street filled with processions, church bells ringing all day, knelling out what they regarded as the doom of their native country. Later on, in the course of his campaign, the Prime Minister of the day, Monsieur Huszár, addressed a great meeting on the subject of the Peace Treaty, which I attended, and his claims were so moderate, so straightforward and so eminently reasonable that I despair of ever hearing anything like them at a General Election addressed by a Prime Minister in this country of ours to-day. He said: "If these people are to be taken away from us, what we want are plebiscites. If they vote against us, we should have free trade, and we should have effective protection of minorities, and without these" he said "we shall never consent to this Treaty — no, no, never!" And it came roaring back to him from 15,000 men in the audience: **"No, no, never!" ...**

Lord Newton, House of Lords, May 5th, 1921:

I have observed with some surprise that in another place the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed the opinion that the Treaty was conceived in no spirit of anger or vengeance, and said that he hoped and believed the new Hungary had every prospect of a splendid and prosperous future. This expression rather reminds me of that of Lord Beaconsfield after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin. When Turkey had lost the greater portion of her European Provinces, Lord Beaconsfield congratulated Turkey of the concentrated form of territory which she was now about to enjoy. It seems to me that to congratulate the Hungarians, and to wish them a happy and prosperous future, is, in the present circumstances, as if you were to congratulate and wish a prosperous future to a men with whom you had been engaged in a desperate struggle, whose leg you had cut off, whose arm you had cut off, whom you had made bankrupt, and to whom you announced , in spite of that, that you intended in future to take from him further money if possible.

I am satisfied in my own mind that no spirit of anger or vengeance animated His Majesty's Government. I firmly believe that His Majesty's Government are well disposed towards the Hungarian. Nevertheless, the fact remains, and has been pointed out by the noble Earl himself, that the population of the country has been reduced from 18 million to 7 million; that two-thirds of its territory has been taken away; that its economic prosperity, at all events for the present, has been, if not entirely destroyed, very seriously impaired; and that millions of Magyars and German-speaking Hungarians have been transferred, quite contrary to the principle of President Wilson —the principle of selfdetermination— to other countries, without being allowed to express any opinion on the question themselves. ...

Viscount Brice, House of Lords, May 5th, 1921:

My Lords, this Treaty is submitted to us as a *fait accompli*. It is too late to make any change in it, though I believe that if the country had known what was being done in Paris we should have been able to evoke public opinion and have prevented a Treaty like this from ever having been concluded. Unfortunately, the country was given no opportunity of knowing what was being done, and we are presented now with a Treaty which it is impossible to change. ... What in the world were the causes of the action which Paris took? A good many things have been revealed as to what was done by the Council of Four, and the Council of Ten; revelations which have been sometimes more interesting than discreet. But no one has carried any lamp into these dark corners in which the fate of Hungary was decided. We do not even know what Power it was that exerted its influence to bring about this Treaty, or from what motives it acted. ...

Hungary was surely entitled to some more respectful and sympathetic treatment. Hungary is one of the oldest kingdoms in Europe. ...

Let me again repeat that I am not aware of any foundation for the allegation that Hungary took a leading part in bringing about the War. That has been constantly stated, but upon no sufficient evidence. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that Count Tisza, in the consultations which were held before the outbreak of the War, when the ultimatum to Serbia was being considered, did his best to dissuade the strong action that was taken and did all that he could as one man, Prime Minister of Hungary, to prevent the War from being then suddenly entered upon. The truth was that it was a small and mischievous camarilla in Vienna, in close conjunction with the Germans, whom we have to thank for the War, and not the public opinion or the statesmen of Hungary. ...

I frankly welcome the hope that the noble Earl expressed that Hungary would still recover itself. I do not despair of Hungary. After all, that which makes the greatness of a country is the spirit of its people; and the spirit of the Hungarian people is not broken. But we cannot but fear that the provisions which are embodied in this Treaty will create a rankling sense of injustice, an anger, and a bitterness that will look for the first chance of redressing the wrongs that the Treaty inflicts. Unjust settlements seldom last. Can any one believe that the arrangements embodied in this Treaty are calculated to create peace? They are more likely to **sow the seeds of future war**, and that at a time when peace is the supreme need of the world.

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The Tragic Fate of Hungary

Extracts from a book under this title published by Nemzetőr, Munich in 1974.

The author of the book is **Yves de Daruvar**, a noted Frenchman, the son of a Hungarian army officer and a French mother transplanted to and educated in France. He served this country in World War II and was made Knight Commander of the Legion of Honour, and Companion of the Order of Liberation.

In the Introduction to the original French Edition General Ingold, former Grand Chancellor of the Order of Liberation writes:

It is not for me to pronounce a comprehensive verdict on this brave, profoundly human and solidly documented book. I will therefore confine myself to the following brief remarks:

This book was written by a man dedicated to the upholding of noble causes — the more seemingly hopeless the better. Thus, at the age of 20, he fought from the Fezzan to Tripolitania and from Tunisia to Normandy under General Leclerc's orders... He shed his blood in the desert so that France may rise from the dead in victory; gravely injured, he suffered agonies for years. Today the youngster of 1940, his willpower and intellect forged by the exercise of high functions overseas in the meantime, is going to war once more. But this time he is carrying no arms. It is this book with which he proposes to fight for the honour of "mutilated" Hungary and, faithful to Leclerc's tradition, he attacks...

The passages referring to the mutilation of Hungary are deeply disturbing. They make us think.

As a veteran of World War I, I feel in duty bound to quote the words of George Roux whose name will turn up frequently on the pages of this book. "Having staked their liberty, if not their existence, fought for 4—5 years to the very limits of their endurance, and made enormous sacrifices, the victors did not feel inclined to show mercy", he wrote. No wonder that such resentment hit thousand-year old Hungary with its full weight. That this should have happened was no doubt an error and a crime. However, victors have rarely practiced clemency throughout the centuries.

May this book mark the beginning of a new era of understanding and forgiveness on the eve of inevitable conflicts.

Lyautey, Marshal of France, branded 1914—1918 "a fratricidal war". Enacted fifty years ago, Trianon remains to this day "a fratricidal peace".

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Another quarter of a century has elapsed since Daruvar's book was originally published. We have also arrived at the 75th anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon, and it is to be noted that by this time the historical events have made the drawing up of a programme for the Union of Europe timely. The one third of the 14 million Hungarian people of the Carpathian Basin who still live in captivity outside the state borders, hoped in 1989 that in the spirit of European Union, the persecution would cease and the people of East Central Europe would march finally together into an emerging United Europe in the spirit of reconciliation. Contrary to their hopes, the persecutions have flared up again. Now free of Moscow's control, boiling with intense nationalism, with almost eight decades of experience, the successor states have set about to eliminate the ethnic Hungarians with revived enthusiasm.

Daruvar's book is a treasure-house of quotations, and we have selected only a few of them for this limited-edition booklet:

"Hungarian yoke"

"Up till 1830", admitted one of the Magyars' most rabid adversaries, "Hungary had been the El Dorado of national equality".(Helfert: «Die Checo-Slaven»). And indeed prior to that point in time, in itself only a rough indication, the linguistic and literary rebirth of Hungary's racial minorities, had been enacted within the boundaries of the historic kingdom, not among their racial brethren living outside those frontiers. This did not, however, prevent the neighbouring countries from benefiting by the generosity of Hungarian liberalism. Thus the culture of the various ethnic groups which over the centuries had come to Hungary as settlers or refugees was found to be flourishing more vigourously under the so-called "Hungarian yoke" than it did in its countries of origin, such as Rumania or Serbia. The best Slavonic and Rumanian philologists taught at the University of Buda where there were also printed and published the first literary and scientific works of Serb, Croat and Slovak authors. As for the first book ever to be printed in the Rumanian language it was published in 1544 under the patronage of a Hungarian prince — a remarkable achievement when one considers that the first Hungarian book was only printed in 1527. This random collection of a few facts suffices to refute the alleged oppression of historic Hungary's national minorities.

Extremist nationalism, unconditionally hostile to the survival of the Kingdom as ultimately to that of the entire Monarchy, had up to World War I been confined to a minute fraction of the middle classes among the national minorities.

War guilt

In fact, practically up to the beginning of the 19th century, Hungarians and non-Hungarians had lived together in perfect harmony.

It was quite clear that Austria-Hungary and Germany only wanted a limited war with Serbia, while France and Russia, as well as Serbia herself, were pushing for a generalised war which alone, in their view, could serve their interest and satisfy their ambitions. Hence Russia and France alone had, from the very beginning, envisaged and prepared for a general European war. Nothing could be more lapidary than *Fabre-Luce*'s conclusion: "Austria's and Germany's acts made the war possible, those of the Entente rendered it unavoidable". Let it be added that although by now everyone agrees on regarding Hitler as a direct consequence of the first world war (Monseigneur Kaas, Archbishop of Trier used to say that Hitler was not born in Braunau but at Versailles) certain responsibilities for that war were much more far-reaching than is generally appreciated. Fortunately, myths woven entirely of falsehoods do not prove to be an enduring fabric, nor can truths be engineered and decreed as such merely by rights of victory over the vanquished. A fact of the gravest significance was, as *Henri Pozzi* so rightly reminds us, that "when the victors drew up the conditions of peace at Versailles, St. Germain

and Trianon, it was the axiom of Germany's guilt, and that of its ally, Austria-Hungary —the axiom of their sole and exclusive war-guilt— which served as moral justification for the victors' implacable decisions."... (***Henri Pozzi:*** *Les Coupables", Paris 1934*).

Aggressors versus Defenders

"There can be no doubt that Hungary —or at any rate the overwhelming majority of the Hungarians— went to war in 1914 in the conviction of fighting for their just cause and with the aim only of preserving what had for a thousand years been recognized as their own. For years, the Hungarians had lived in the full knowledge of Serbia's intention to destroy the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, especially since the latter had annexed Bosnia-Hercegovina. It was also generally known that Russia supported Serbia's aspirations to establishing a Greater Serbia based on the South-Slavonic areas of Austria-Hungary. Once it became evident that Russia had been privy to the Serb conspiracy which contrived the double murder at Sarajevo, their common purpose being to unleash a generalized war in the course of which they might conquer the Slav-inhabited territories of the Monarchy, Hungary resolved to go to war against Russia. Also, the Magyars had never been able to forget that Russia had been the cause of the failure of their war for freedom of 1848—1849, directed against the Habsburgs, and that the Russians had delivered their country to the vengeance of Austrian absolutism." (***Jules Altenburger:*** *La Hongrie et la Première Guerre Mondiale, Budapest, 1919*).

Lies and exalted ideas

The treaties of 1919—1920 were in large measure the product of "the environment in which they had been concluded", as **Georges Roux** so admirably explained between the two wars. (*Georges Roux: Reviser les traités? Paris 1931*). Here is the gist of what he stated, confirming and supplementing our affirmation on the subject:

"Having staked their very existence or their liberty, fought 4 to 5 years throwing in their last ounce of strength and made immense sacrifices, the victors —exasperated and resentful to the extreme— did not feel inclined to exercise fairness, moderation and leniency. To keep the morale of their belligerents at the requisite peak of tension, the government had recourse to an intensive propaganda of lies. ... The distortion of truth became the law of self-preservation and hatred a sacred emotion. ... Justifications of morality and idealistic aims were fabricated out of nothing in order to electrify one's own people and demoralize the adversary's. Also, the shining image of a peace concept, motivated not by egoism but exalted ideas, began increasingly to be bandied about. The American intervention accentuated that trend, stamping the struggle with the hallmark of disinterestedness and evangelical principles. ... It was in that kind of atmosphere that the Allied and Associated Powers were facing, late in 1918, the collapse of the Central Empires. ... Victory came all of a sudden and almost unexpectedly. After a long row of failure upon failure, the Allies were ill-prepared for their triumph which consequently went to their heads. And the need to act quickly left them little time for reflection. Within a few months, still in a drunken haze of success, peace was made and a new Europe constructed without any deeper preparation of thought but with unlimited discretionary powers. ... The misuse of victory —continues Georges Roux— although a mistake in the political sense is an allurement hard to avoid. Germany had not been able to escape from it either in 1871. ... Moreover the victorious powers were tied, hands and feet, by covenants earlier concluded between themselves or with their small auxiliaries. ...

Ignorance extraordinary

"The great empires of peace did not have a first notion of the geography, ethnography or history of the peoples and countries whose fate they had to decide. Wilson, for example, kept muddling up *Slovaks* and *Slovenes*. Nor was Lloyd George any better informed. As for Clémenceau, all has long ago been stated about his stupendous ignorance concerning all things not pertaining to a certain romantic view of French history or French domestic politics." (***Henri Pozzi:*** *Les Coupables, Paris 1934*).

Games of grab

"Czech, Rumanian and Serb diplomats doled out around the green baize table of Trianon heaps of the most superficial, erroneous and tendentious information, distorting facts, engineering statistics and faking the will of the populations concerned in remarkably bad faith. Their task, in the performance of which no one excelled more than *Edouard Benes*, was facilitated by the shameful mediocrity of the Western negotiators. ... They simply conceded everything they had been asked for. ... And all the while Mr. Benes continued dishing up the grossest historic, geographical and ethnological absurdities in his quiet, smiling manner, often contradicting himself, without anyone at the Conference daring to object for fear that his crass ignorance might be found out. ... A marvellous game of grab, indeed." ... (***Gabriel Gobron:*** *La Hongrie mystérieuse, Paris 1933*).

"The Peace Treaty of Trianon was born in an environment particularly ill-suited to the creation of wise and enduring constructions. The great allied statesmen called upon to play the role of arbitrators knew little of those far-away regions of Eastern Europe with which they had to deal. So they left the job to the young claimants themseves, placing their confidence in those gallant Serbs, in the Rumanians, the spoilt adoptive children of France, and chiefly in two Czechs whose influence was considerable at the time the peace treaties were being drafted — Messrs Benes and Masaryk. ... Friendly connections at the highest level in the allied camp enabled them to help themselves, and their associates, handsomely to the good things they craved." (***Georges Roux:*** *Reviser les traités? Paris 1931*).

"Out of a hotch-potch of fakes and forgeries, out of a chaos of falsehoods was woven the Treaty of Trianon, lined with a map of absurdities, and the Hungarian plenipotentiaries, unable to make their protest heard, cooped up at the Château de Madrid under police surveillance, with all their communications with the outside world heavily censored, were forced to sign it without any discussion, the swords of our worn-out diplomats pointed at them". (***Georges Desbons:*** *La Hongrie aprés le Traité de Trianon, Paris 1933*).

Falsehoods and fabrications

One could go on proliferating quotations of that kind indefinitely. *David Lloyd George* himself pronounced the verdict in a speech at the Guildhall in London, on October 7, 1928, when he admitted that the entire documentation they had been provided with by "some of their allies" during the peace negotiations was a bundle of falsehoods and fabrications. They had made their decisions on the basis of fakes. "That terrible accusation which has never been answered —*wrote Henri Pozzi*— also spells out the responsibility of the allied negotiators. How could it be that they should not have noticed soon the procedures employed by the representatives of Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade, in order to subvert their good faith with those fancy statistics, fake petitions, tricks and lies which made Trianon one of the worst iniquities in diplomatic history." (***Henri Pozzi:*** *La Guerre revient, Paris 1933*).

Creation of artifical states

So many crushing testimonials of levity, thoughtlessness, ignorance and indeed scandalous bias on the part of the Western delegates to the Peace Conference leave one speechless. At least they ought to have mistrusted that morbid hunger for territorial gain so openly displayed by the small successor states, instead of encouraging the brazen greed with which, over and above the "liberation" of their own racial brethren, they went all out to capture great numbers of Magyar hostages, too. In that they mutually cooperated, for it was obvious that the greater the number of accomplices in hostility surrounding her, the more easily could Hungary be gagged. The success of their joint action was so stupendous that it has been said —however incredible it may sound— that even Benes felt rather frightened when confronted with its sum total. It explains at any rate why the frontiers drawn at Trianon did hardly ever coincide with ethnographic boundaries and did in fact deliberately cut into massive Hungarian populations. If one is to believe the rapporteur of the Trianon Treaty, the French politician *Charles Daniélou*, in the ultimate resort the victors did not so much want to "punish" Hungary than rather to satisfy the demands of the successor states, "with the result that there were allowed to subsist among the peoples of Danubian Europe frictions of discontent hard to smooth over". In other words, instead of restoring and consolidating good understanding between those countries, in the higher interest of Europe as a whole, their quarrels had been further embittered by arbitrary dissections, rendering impossible for a long time that kind of collaboration between the Hungarians and their neighbours which had always prevailed to the 19th century. Territories wrenched from Hungary had been turned into ready coinage with which to pay the price of alliances contracted during the war. To quote *Henri Pozzi* once more: "The question at Trianon was not who was right; the question was who should be declared right in the interest of the victors." ...

This was confirmed by a Member of the British House of Commons, *Sir Robert Gower*, who recalled that "the Czechoslovak Republic was recognized by the Entente Powers in advance during the summer of 1918. On the other hand secret treaties had been concluded prior to the armistice. The one signed on August 18, 1916, had promised the Rumanians, in addition to Transylvania, a considerable portion of the Great Hungarian Plain. In the course of one of its meetings, held in June 1918, the Supreme Council of the Entente, decided to set up a state for the Southern Slavs as one of the war aims to be achieved. However, that decision could only be put into practice by dismembering Hungary. A country had thus been condemned without ever being heard." (***Sir Robert Gower:*** *La Révision du Traité de Trianon, Paris 1937*).

In that way secret treaties had decided about the partition of Hungary long before the Peace Conference. And *Clémenceau* declared not less cynically: **"The peace treaties are yet another means to continue the war".**

At Trianon the Hungarian delegation had been fully prepared, in view of the circumstances, to comply with frontiers to be determined by plebiscites, organized under impartial international supervision and thereafter to establish new relationships with Hungary's neighbours on an equitable basis. But Hungary's plea was sternly rejected. "It is difficult to understand —wrote *Sir Robert Gower*— why Hungary's claim, based as it was on President Wilson's own principle, was rejected. The thesis that popular consultation properly speaking had been rendered superfluous by the clearly expressed will of the various nationalities just does not stand up to scrutiny, and it certainly does not justify the severing of three and a half million Hungarians from the mother country. (***Sir Robert Gower:*** *La Révision du Traité de Trianon, Paris 1937*).

As to why, really, the populations concerned were not granted the right of speaking up for themselves, *André Tardieu* —who was to become twice Prime Minister of the Third Republic between the wars— reveals the truth bluntly in his book entitled *La Paix* (Peace) in the following terms: "**We had to choose between organizing plebiscites or creating Czechoslovakia!**"

André Tardieu, on assuming his functions as chairman of the Committee called upon to settle the fate of Austria-Hungary, declared bluntly: **"No pity must be shown to Hungary!"** — echoing incidentally *General Franchet d'Esperey*'s brutal outburst to Michael Károlyi: **"Your country shall pay and atone."** ...

Such was the frame of mind of the leaders of France at that time. "All counter-proposals, all protests —*adds Henri Pozzi*— were met by the inexorable opposition of André Tardieu". And he goes on: "The Trianon Peace Conference will appear on the record of history well informed as the handiwork of André Tardieu. Hiding behind Clémenceau and Wilson he did all. ... Today we are able to take the true measure of the immense mistake which he caused the victorious allies to commit at Trianon, actuated by blind hatred, by his ruthless concern for ensuring the fullness of loot to the Czech and Serb Slavs as well as their Rumanian associates, the loot which they craved and the possession of which he —their collaborator and paid hireling of many years' standing— had guaranteed them." (***Henri Pozzi:*** *Les Coupables, Paris 1934*).

French opponents of Trianon

For the sake of historic truth and in fairness to France there existed at the time which is the object of these recollections another school of thought. It represented quite obviously the best of the intellectual and moral forces of the country, but it

was unable to prevail against the others and impose its views upon them. But at least it raised a great number of voices. *Gabriel Gobron*, in his book already often quoted on these pages, passed some of them in review:

"Trianon? A peace of ignorance, —declared *Gabriel Hanotaux.*— A peace of cruel imagination, according to *Senator de Monzie.* A peace disorganizing Europe, said *Monsieur Lanail.* A peace which the fathers of the glorious dead for the fatherland could not have had the courage to ratify, admitted *Monsieur de Lamarzelle.* An imperfect peace, emphasized *Aristide Briand.* And why not add to that rosary of sad assessments the word of *Paul Doumer*, President of the Senate: 'Poor Hungary to which we've been so unjust...'

A year went by, —*continues Gabriel Gobron*— before the powers in control plucked up sufficient courage to present the criminal Treaty of Trianon to the French Parliament for ratification. For it the French negotiators had been at least as responsible as their Allied colleagues. When confronted by Czech trickery they could have examined objectively the Hungarian objections formulated by *Count Albert Apponyi.* But nothing of that kind was done because those responsible did not wish to do so. Yet, being embarrassed by their own negativism they held out fallacious promises of rectification and revision for a vague future. Such was *Millerand's* ill-famed *covering letter* which was merely *heaping insult* upon injury. And as to the attempts at whitewashing the French negotiators and Parliamentarians, if they were not guilty, how could be made sense of some of the protestations? Such as Lamarzelle, Paul Boncour, Charles Daniélou, Anatole de Monzie, Charles Tisseyre, Aristide Briand etc. **Trianon was a criminal act;** there is no other term to describe adequately the most wicked of all wartime treaties, imposed amid the vapours of blood, the haze of gunpowder, the exaltation of victory and the 'Schadenfreude' derived from torturing the vanquished. This was the generosity of France for you! Torchbearer of civilization indeed! Her so-called policy of greatness, humaneness and readiness to sacrifice, etc. ... to quote only the most pompous and hackneyed clichés of the French professional politicians' vocabulary! ... What monstrously pitiful unawareness! ... Because to us the name of France is inseparable from the notion of JUSTICE" —concludes *Gabriel Gobron*— "Let us ask forgiveness of a Hungary impoverished and aggrieved because of the ills which our elders and betters have inflicted upon her!" ... (***Gabriel Gobron:*** *La Hongrie mystérieuse, Paris 1933*).

May we refer at this juncture to some French contemporary opinions, expressed more elaborately than the preceding statements. Take for example, *Senator de Monzie*:

"The psychologists of history will never understand why the French politicians of our day were so dead set against Hungary alone, risking to transfer her remains to those very powers which we always pretended to look upon as a future menace. What Neronian madness pushes us to starting irredentist movements, as though we wished deliberately to maintain endemic seats of fire around a people which we loathe so much that we throw it as fuel for recurring incendiary flames to feed on? ... By what aberration of the mind did the same men who had been trumpeting all over the world the sanctity of rational and national rights, deprive the Magyars of towns the entire population of which —apart from a very few exceptions— spoke Hungarian, and indeed was Hungarian by origin, heart and culture? Why, indeed why?" (***Charles Tisseyre:*** *Une erreur diplomatique: La Hongrie mutilée, Paris 1922*).

Where Hungary stood and why?

Charles Tisseyre, Member of the Chamber of Deputies, had this to say:

"It needed all the bad faith of some to join forces with the ignorance of others in order to cut to pieces, on account of some imaginary oppressiveness, that marvellous entity which was ancient Hungary. That nation, which had lived the reality of administrative and political unity for 10 centuries and which by virtue of its geographical conformation represented an economic entity was torn to shreds under the pretext of consisting of disparate nationalities. And by so doing what have they achieved?

They have created three new countries inhabited by a mixture of races even more disparate than that of Hungary had been.

They destroyed the political and economic unity of a strong and sound country so as to build from its fragments new states whose unity is much more fragile. ...

Hungary attributes to France, not unjustifiedly, the responsibility for the errors and injustices from which she suffers. This state of affairs must not be allowed to last forever. Why did France allow all this to happen?... This Treaty is our handiwork. Thanks to a policy of blunder, contradictory to long historic experience, we have alienated a nation which everything ought to attract to France. ...

The Hungarians were the faithful and loyal allies of the Germans during the late war? All right, do not let us forget that. However, are we entitled to blame the Hungarians for having become Germany's allies? Didn't we push them by favouring as much as we have done the growth of Panslavism in the countries of Austria-Hungary? ...

Now Trianon has thrust Hungary into Germany's arms once more. ...

Was it thinkable that Hungary could afford not to go to war on Austria's side? We all know today what attitude Count Tisza had adopted in the Crown Council in Vienna, held on the morrow of the Sarajevo murders.

As for the Hungarians, their war was not directed against France: they fought against the Russians and Serbs who threatened them. ...

Throughout the war French subjects were enabled to live in Budapest as free individuals, subject to no coercion, free to speak their language — and the theatres in Budapest continued producing French plays. ... And need one to add that the outbreak of Count Michael Károlyi's revolution was accompanied by the cry 'Long live France'? That we wished to punish Hungary for having participated in the war, is something that may be discussed. But why treat her more harshly than Germany or Austria? The Hungarians have not been able to get a jot of justice out of France. No wonder that as time went by, they have come to regard France as the sole source of all the ills which have befallen Hungary since Trianon. ...

The French press excells especially by its anti-Magyar ravings. ...

In Hungary you get the impression that every one of their misfortunes comes from France. ...

After all this you ask yourself if you are awake or dreaming; what could have been the incentive of those who built that **monument of insanity** which is Trianon?" (***Charles Tisseyre:*** *Une erreur diplomatique: La Hongrie mutilée*).

Grave consequences of Trianon

"The monumental error of the treaties of 1919—1920 consisted in having led to results diametrically opposed to the aims pursued. They did in fact surrender Central Europe to the Germans, only to have it handed over subsequently to the Russians, since it is quite clear today that the treaties in question favoured those two imperialisms much more than would have the preservation of an Austria-Hungary remodelled by the Allies. The Germans would have found it much more difficult to exercise their influence in Slovakia, Croatia and Transylvania than they actually did if those regions had remained united with Hungary. The "Drang nach Osten" was made much easier to realize than it would have been, had it found blocking its forward march a Hungary still in the possession of her essential pride and power, traditionally averse to both Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism."

(End of quotations from Daruvar's book).

The destruction of Central Europe's political unity has created a power vacuum in this "Marchland" region. The fragmentation of the states has prevented the formation of a strong buffer-zone between the rival eastern and western powers and there is little chance today that the present states of the region will ever reach a state of sincere cooperation.

For centuries the domination of these Marchlands has been the key to European supremacy. This is why the First World War was followed by the second one: frustrated in their attempts to extend their influence over the region, both Russia and Germany used the between-wars period to extend their influence over the countries of Central Europe. Both powers had suffered defeat at the end of World War I. It would have been opportune therefore to establish a strong independent zone here to hold both powers at bay. Unfortunately, the Trianon Treaty had fragmented the area and had set the nations against each other, instead of uniting them. Germany was the first to move. Gradually Germany coerced the small nations into her camp: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia-Croatia, Hungary in 1938—41 whilst the only state to resist, Poland was conquered in 1939 (in concert with Russia).

The other rival power, Soviet Russia, began its conquest by the occupation of Poland, followed by the annexation of the Baltic states (1940) and the attack on Finland (1939—40). When the German— Russian conflict turned into a Russian advance, the Soviet extended its domination over most of Central Europe.

Europe's Powder Magazine

Gross Injustices Making for War

by Viscount Rothermere

Parts of an article from

Daily Mail, London, August 30th, 1927.

Paramount with the Allies during the Great War was the desire that when peace came, it should be permanent. Whatever else victory might bring, the men and women of the Allied nations wanted to ensure that there should be no more Alsace-Lorraines to keep the war-spirit smouldering.

It was the professed aim of the Peace Conference, when it gathered in Paris in 1919, to rearrange the map of Europe on a basis of self-determination. But as its work went on, this principle faded from sight. The result has been that Central Europe to-day is piled high with the materials of a new conflagration. The primary cause of this is the partitioning of the Hungarian nation among its neighbours by the Treaty of Trianon, imposed upon Hungary in June 1920, which transferred —in compact masses contiguous with the main body of the Hungarian people— 600,000 Hungarians to Rumania (out of a total of 1,750,000, most of whom are intermingled with the Rumanians), 1,000,000 to Czecho-Slovakia, and 400,000 to Jugo-Slavia.

In the Peace Treaty made with Germany the principle of self-determination was so thoroughly applied that a plebiscite was even held in Schleswig to revive the frontier which the Prussians had imposed upon the Danes in 1864. But with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles the principal Allied statesmen relaxed their efforts. The task of settling with their chief enemy had been a prodigious one. Their powers of personal application were exhausted. The affairs of their own countries urgently claimed their attention. The drafting of peace terms with Germany's minor allies seemed to them a secondary matter which they might well leave to the subordinate members of their delegations.

For similar reasons the world's interest in peacemaking evaporated, and the light of publicity which had been concentrated on the work of the Conference was withdrawn. In reality only half the work of restoring a lasting peace to Europe had been performed. But the importance of what yet remained to be done was overshadowed by the achievement already accomplished, and the remaining treaties were left to be drafted behind closed doors and signed amid general indifference many months later in various suburbs in Paris.

This negligent procedure suited very well the intrigues of various minor nationalities which had come to be associated with the Allied cause, and which stood to profit considerably from the settlements thus obscurely made.

Representatives of these new-fangled nationalities immediately began to arrive in large numbers in Paris, where, with the aid of certain doctrinaire pamphleteers of Allied nationality, they set themselves to pull every available string to ensure that the particular peace treaty affecting their own small State should be as profitable as possible to their public and private interests. This was how grave abuses, containing the sure seed of future wars, crept into the Central European peace settlement.

These abuses were committed in the name of self-determination. If that principle had been strictly observed all round, there would have been no cause for complaint.

What I claim for Hungary is no more than elementary justice. The idea of a return to her pre-war frontiers is out of the question. Hungary must pay the penalty of defeat. But that is no reason for inflicting upon her such wrongs as the war was expressly waged to abolish. She has a perfectly righteous and reasonable claim to recover the territories preponderantly inhabited by Hungarians which, as a result of the Treaty of Trianon, are cut off from all intercourse with her by every device that the malevolence of her neighbours can invent.

This state of things is an outrage to an ancient and splendid people with a history of high endeavour extending over a thousand years. It is fundamentally wrong, and it cannot endure. There is time now to right it peaceably and effectively. If we continue to close our eyes to the evil it will keep alive the spirit of hatred and hostility in Central Europe, with the inevitable result of a disastrous war.

Are we so blind as to let the elements of another terrible conflict accumulate unchecked? It is the duty of Britain, France and Italy, as the members of the League of Nations primarily responsible for the present situation, to take steps to give Hungary the relief to which she is entitled. Their generosity in this matter will not be abused. They will be dealing with a nation which, though small, has a character and traditions second to none. I repeat that Hungary is the natural ally of Britain, France and Italy in Central Europe. Even during the war she showed her natural good feeling towards Britain and the United States by refusing to intern her British and American residents, who were allowed to continue their usual occupations. She was hardly more than a technical enemy of these two countries and she will make a loyal and reliable friend of whatever nation extends to her a helping hand in her day of emergency and distress.

On March 26th, 1929:

No observant man can travel through Central Europe today, or even study its incoherent political divisions on the map, without realising the recklessness with which real and vital interests were trampled underfoot in making that arbitrary and ill-informed re-distribution of territory.

All natural principles of frontier delimitation were rejected. The new boundaries had no justification, whether ethnographic or economic. They set up in Central Europe a permanent condition of inconvenience, friction and discontent which, if it is not remedied, must inevitably lead to another war.

*

Rothermere refers to this in his book „Warnings and Predictions" published in 1939 as follows:

It was between 1930 and 1936 well within the competence of the British Government, acting through Geneva, to force upon Europe a revision of the unjust treaties of Versailles, Trianon and St. Germain. If an abstract love of justice had not prompted it, the motive of self-preservation might have provoked such a course

Nothing was done!

*

One nation in eight states

In our days the accepted definition of "national minority" usually refers to a group of people, who migrated into the established country of another nation and failed to assimilate.

This is why immigration states, which accept migrants to increase their population fail to understand that there are some minority groups who want to keep their own language, culture, and demand their own institutions, they want to maintain the character of their villages and towns, and want to administer the land they are inhabiting in the form of autonomy.There are no immigration states in Central Europe, consequently no migrant minorities. The minority problem does not originate from movement of people but from movement of country's borders. In Central Europe, mainly in the Carpathian Basin the concept of national minority means a group of people who were born where they live, whose ancestors established the villages, towns and civilization. In view of this fact they should not really be called "minority" but probably fellow-nationality. Not "minority rights" should be demanded by them, but at least the status of co-dominionship with local-, personal- and collective autonomy. They should be considered as a companion-nation of the particular state.

The four million Hungarians who live outside the borders of the Hungarian state are considered as part of the Hungarian nation, only they are prevented from living together by state borders and by many lawful and unlawful means. To retain national identity is a just demand.

The Hungarian nation today lives in eight states: Hungary, Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, Rumania, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Before the Treaty of Trianon, these eight parts of the nation lived in one state and even today live on contiguous territory. Naturally they constitute a "minority" in the successor states, but the definition above does not apply, because they are natives of that particular land, they didn't migrate from their motherland. They were torn away together with their birthplace, and forced under the domination of alien states. Accordingly they cannot be considered as ethnic minorities but as part of the Hungarian nation and at the same time they are one of the nationalities of the particular state into which they have been forced to live. Of the 14 million Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin only 10 million live together, 4 million were forced apart under hostile conditions. As the state borders moved across the nation's body very few opportunities were available to various Hungarians to liaise with each other during the last 75 years.

The Hungarians on both sides of the borders are one nation, ethnographically they are part of the majority nation inhabiting the Carpathian Basin for eleven hundred years. Here they held established statehood for the same eleven hundred years, building this complete geographical unit in Central Europe into a lasting and functioning economic, political and cultural entity long before the Vlach immigrants, forefathers of the Rumanians, began to migrate into the Eastern part of their country. On the ethnographical map of the Carpathian Basin this Hungarian majority still constitutes an almost uninterrupted unity.

In the course of history, over the past centuries, large numbers of foreigners, in other words other national groups, immigrated and settled in historic Hungary, and in compliance with this the state rearranged itself accordingly. In modern terms Hungary has always been a multinational state. This is discussed in the next chapter.

What History proves

The year 1996 marks the 1100th anniversary of the establishment of the Hungarian State. What was the situation at the time when the Hungarian State was founded in the area now called Central Europe? **Count Julius Andrássy** describes it in his book "**The Development of Hungarian Constitutional Liberty**" (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. London, 1908) as follows:

"The new state was not in the way of the expanding European powers which were then dominant.

The establishment of the Hungarians in their new home was not therefore opposed to the tendencies of the age. On the contrary, in the long run it actually furthered those tendencies. It was to this fortunate circumstance that the Hungarian nation owed the possibility of its development. But this development was brought about not merely by a lucky chance, but also by the exercise of great political sagacity. The Hungarians had the good sense to be content with the territory they had acquired, and to refrain from attempting any further conquests. The policy of conquest never became a national policy in Hungary. There was, in fact, a somewhat exaggerated tendency in the opposite direction.

One of the most difficult problems of statecraft is to harmonise liberty with order. How many great nations are still struggling with this problem, and how many nations in the past have come to grief because of their inability to solve it.

It is to the lasting credit of the Hungarians that as early as the thirteenth century they were careful of this twofold interest, and that even in the moment of victory the nobles did not forget the interest of the State, but endeavoured to strengthen the monarchy.

The **Golden Bull** (1222) was an expression of these different needs. It was designed to strengthen the king's power as well as to assure to the priviliged classes their rights. It determined the rights of the nation in accordance with tradition in respect to military service, taxation, inheritance and the administration of justice. All the nobles had equal rights and every noble was entitled to attend the King's Council, which had to be convened every year. Everyone present had the right to speak concerning any injury he had suffered, and although the chief purpose of the Council was the administration of justice, yet it furnished opportunities for the discussion of political questions as well. The nobles were all alike subject to the jurisdiction of the king and the palatine, and there was no trace of the feudal lawcourts. In short, no member of the class of nobles had more rights than another. All had equal right to own land, and to have a share in political power, and were liable to the same military service.

The Golden Bull established first of all the rights of the Hungarian nobility, but its protection was extended to their retainers, and also to **foreign** settlers."

(End of quotations from Count J. Andrássy' book).

Mutual consequences

When the Magyars established the Hungarian state in the Carpathian Basin there was a state of interregnum there: the Avar Empire had already collapsed, and the area was waiting for a new state founder.

Hungary didn't have any ethnic problems till the 19th century, although, during the foundation of the Hungarian state in 896 A. D. several tribes, ethnic groups, did dwell in the Carpathian Basin. These people, accepted the rule of the Hungarian state, because it meant protection for them. Most of these people were related to the state-creating Magyars, like for instance the Avars. They also found small fragments of various Slavic ethnic groups who settled into the country during the centuries of the the Avar Empire, but never were able to establish a state.

Therefore, **Hungary** from the very beginning, using today's expression, was a **multinational state**. This didn't cause any problems, not even when after 150 years of Turkish occupation half of the inhabitants were of different nationalities due to immigration of refugees and new settlers.

These settlers quite naturally accepted to become loyal subjects of the **Hungarian Crown**. The only exception was Croatia, a codominion of the Holy Crown for 800 years enjoying the protection of a larger unit. *Non-Magyars* have become members of the rather numerous Hungarian nobility quite easily and without any restriction of racial consideration. So they have become *part of the nation*, equal subjects of the Hungarian Crown. This is how the man-made constitution served and satisfied the *nature-made* economic, geographic, strategic unit: the **Carpathian Basin**.

The doctrine of the *Holy Crown* successfully safeguarded the unity of the Carpathian Basin for ten centuries, but was unable to have an answer to the historical challenge which originated from the shady side of the French Revolution, namely nationalism.

The First World War on the part of the World Powers was waged against Germany, but at the end, they smashed the very country which developed and practiced the idea of a common state for many races and maintained for them an atmosphere of harmonious life. Those nations lost everything that this economic and cultural unit offered and received in exchange hatred, misery, misunderstanding, war, devastation, insecurity, instability and a hopeless future.

This should be contemplated now and anew by people living in this area.

A Hungarian Dilemma becomes a vital issue

Excerpts from a publication on the Treaty of Trianon in 1990 by the Human Rights Committee of the Hungarian Council of New South Wales.

War is not the right source of peace

Nationalism cannot be fought by means of propaganda, not even by logical arguments. There is no way of fighting it while the current international order has a tendency to re-generate *nationalism*. Fascism finds its base and support in the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a "sovereign" state. It is even helped by the very concept of *national states* and their inviolable borders.

Minority status is not an act of God, but the unfortunate outcome of human negligence. As such, it should be possible to resolve satisfactorily the problems it engenders. First of all, a solution by war ought to be excluded, because wars do not improve the situation, only add more injustices. Arbitration by larger nations or the great powers cannot provide the necessary solution either. A particularly good example for this is the case of Transylvania. In 1940 it was divided between Hungary and Rumania by the arbitration of the two Central European powers of the time, Germany and Italy. (That was the so-called Second Vienna Award). The only result was the acquisition by both parties, Hungary and Rumania, of roughly equal ratios of minorities, an unpopular acquisition. At the end of World War II, as a result of decisions made by the victorious Allied Powers, the Transylvanian situation reverted to its interwar state, whereby *Rumania again became the multi-ethnic state*, while Hungary remained the country deprived of her former territories and populations. Therefore, let us exclude from the available solutions the declaration of war, transfer of whole populations, slicing up of territories and arbitrary shifting of millions of people.

The present developments in East—Central Europe demonstrate a further significant point: whether the borders and the national minorities should stay as they are (maintaining the status quo), or undergo modification, because those differing ethnic populations which have been feeling hostile to one another for the past 75 years will continue to feel the same in the future as well. By now, the very existence of the current borders is the cause of hatred. Even the confederation concept would not work any more, as is amply demonstrated by the federated Yugoslavia, which has already desintegrated into its former constituent parts.

The fate of minorities as an index of democracy

The manifold difficulties associated with minority populations reached their peak during the period of dictatorships. To be in minority status in a community which is planned to be homogeneous in the interest of uniform governing-capability, or some kind of racial theory, means being in the way of a power which quite willingly would awaken and maintain general public animosity against this minority. What type of action is taken by the rulers in such a situation? All ills and lack of success are singled out as having been caused by the minority. In this way, the eventual destruction of the minority becomes a national and patriotic matter, and the more primitive the given ruling community in a particular country, the worse is the condition of the minority, with its different language, religion and culture. If, on top of this, the minority section of the population happens to be culturally and educationally on a higher, more advanced level, it could even be surrounded by hatred. This kind of hatred transforms the members of a minority, sooner or later, into a community of persecuted individuals.

The qualitative index of democracy in a country is the nature of its treatment of minorities. Democracy can only exist where even the smallest ethnic group speaking a different tongue and following a different religion or sect has the constitutional right to use its own language, live according to its own culture and worship according to its own religion. If the aim of democracy is **harmony** in the whole population of a state, then the fundamental aspect of democracy is its capacity for **tolerance**. It may be that a dictatorship is capable of some grand achievements by sheer concentration of force, but the purpose of human existence is not the realization of grand schemes but life itself, individual life. Every individual has a right to live, a **fundamental human right**. Each individual has the right to a particular, self-chosen mode of life, so that the desired quality of life can be attained according to an individual's abilities and personal wishes.

High time for a change

We wish to sound a warning —though we do not know precisely whom we should warn— that a new settlement of the minority problems in East—Central Europe is both timely and urgent while the current reforms and rearrangements are in process. The rearrangements must be all-encompassing, over the entire continent, and at the same time they must be sufficiently radical, embedded in such an overall, general change that the very reason for, and possibility of, expansionist policies which lead to one country occupying or conquering another would be removed.

Europe is on the threshold of momentous changes. A United Nations of Europe appears to be in the making. However, at the same time the present boundaries of states seem to be regarded as valid for all times. These two concepts are in conflict with each other, because either the existing division into sovereign states is perpetuated, and the significance of the borders thereby maintained or the present significance of state borders lessened by transforming them into purely administrative boundaries.

The European wars over the past few centuries could almost without exception be described as **conflicts over territories**. Every "peace" (i. e. peace treaty) was really a perpetuation of conditions imposed by force of war, i.e. by military conquest, or by **expansionism**. The present "peace" in Europe, despite its 50 years' duration is in actuality a peace arbitrarily maintained by force of arms. Human souls have not yet achieved peace, but it is now timely that they do so. In Europe, and particularly in multi-ethnic Central Europe, the state boundaries were fashioned not only from barbed wire but also out of animosity. It is not sufficient to cut the barbed wire. Real peace can only come if the accumulated tensions of the past 75 years are relaxed as well.

Cultural entities in place of nation-states

It is of paramount importance to depart from the concept of the ***nation state***. It may be replaced by a new concept of ***cultural state*** to reach all parts of a nation irrespective of state borders, without restriction. Furthermore, it must be recognized that there are certain natural regional units, which are intrinsically indivisible, which cannot be divided without the region as a whole suffering.

One such unique natural geographic unit is **Transylvania**, with its diverse nationalities, mixed cultures, one uniform history and one destiny. If it could not belong to Hungary (as it does not since World War I for reasons given above), it should not belong to Rumania either, and for the very same reasons. But there is another significant reason for denying Rumania the possession of Transylvania. This land is the classic cradle of the principle of religious tolerance, which in 1557 was enacted as law by the Diet of Torda. Thus Transylvania —(at that time the real centre of Hungarian culture, because of the Ottoman conquest of the middle part of Hungary)— became the first country in Europe to introduce the practice of *religious tolerance*. But Transylvania was also the classic country of the *toleration of all nationalities* on its soil. All the various ethnic groups that appeared and then disappeared over many centuries were able to enjoy their folk-cultural life undisturbed. This peaceful coexistence of various nationalities, the indigenous Hungarians (incl. Székelys), the German settlers and the refugee-settler Rumanians from the Balkans, was disturbed by the emerging nationalism of the 19th century.

Another integral part of the Carpathian Basin is the so-called "Upland" (the present-day Slovakia) which historically forms a cultural entity with Hungary. It was in this region that Prince Rákóczi's War of Independence (1703—1711) was mainly fought against Austrian absolutism. Slovakians, too, fought enthusiastically on the side of the Hungarians under Prince Rákóczi's banner, the two ethnic groups showing conspicuous *solidarity*. Many Slovaks also supported the 1848—49 Revolution organized by the Hungarian patriot Louis Kossuth.

In the southern part of the Carpathian Basin, just north of the Sava — Danube line (the present Vojvodina area), Hungarians fought against the Ottoman Empire together with Serbs and, to some extent, Rumanians for centuries. As the Ottoman Turks advanced northwards, many Serbs, and also Rumanians, had to *migrate* north of the Danube and settle in what was Hungarian territory at the time. The centuries-long occupation by the Ottoman Turks devastated Serbia, as well as Wallachia and Moldavia (in parts of present-day Rumania), making them relatively backward.

Transylvania, this beautiful gem of land, with its medieval villages and famous universities was taken over and crushed by the intolerant attitude and barely endurable colonization policy of the invading Wallachian-Rumanians at the end of World War I. This was crowned by Ceausescu's plan of "homogenization" and "systematization": a program which was planned to be carried out with ultra-fascist methods to create the "homogeneous Rumanian people".

It is in the interest of all Europeans to have the whole of Transylvania nominated for *World Heritage Listing*, not only because of its natural beauty and richness, but also that Transylvanian culture and its centuries-old model of ethnic and religious tolerance may be restored and preserved. Yes, indeed, this is in the interest of all mankind, for the Transylvanian model promises every country in the world a solution for her nationality/minority problems, problems which are a nagging source of conflict everywhere.

The need for an Intracontinental Charter

There is a need for a dual constitution in every European country. Firstly a European Constitution (as the common land of nations) and, secondly, a Constitution for the Nation. The two together may form the administrative constitution of the region, and this will have to form the preliminary conditions for acceptance into the European Community of Countries.

While Transylvania and other parts of the Carpathian Basin taken from Hungary are only the birthplace of the Hungarians and not their caring and beloved fatherland at the same time, nobody should be surprised about the attitude of Hungarians demanding a sufficiently adequate expanse of land to accommodate all the ancestral Hungarian ethnic groups. The fate of four million ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of today's Hungary is likely to seriously burden the conscience of the political and spiritual leaders of Hungary and to make them question the justification of the present state boundaries.

The anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon has to be commemorated, because it is a 75 year old burden of reparation in international law. Let the present anniversary of the Treaty be the occasion for calling for the lifting this seventy-five year old burden on the moral conscience of the world. May mankind also draw a lesson from the past seventyfive years and avoid the occurence of another Trianon-type settlement, not only in the Carpathian Basin, but indeed anywhere in the world.

The hushed-up opinion of an American diplomat

In the Preface of his book entitled ***Hungary the Unwilling Satellite*** (The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1947) **John Flournoy Montgomery** wrote the following:

To us, the first war appeared primarily as a conflict between Germany and our allies in western Europe because it was there that our troups fought. Austria-Hungary to us was a German satellite, and the part played by Russian autocracy was soon and conveniently forgotten. We were not burdened with knowledge of eastern European history and snatched gratefully the simple formulae offered by foreign propagandists. Since Germany was the enemy, Germany was wrong; since Germany was wrong, her Austro-Hungarian ally was wrong too. Since Russia was about to quit, why bother with her? France, Italy, England and Japan were certainly right.

Americans do not seem to be aware that the most fervent longing of modern nationalists is not for freedom but for mastery. Austria-Hungary seemed ramshackle to Americans. Russia, just as heterogeneous as she, did not seem so, because the Czars, more reactionary than the Hapsburgs, had kept their subjects illiterate.

Making good use of our impression that we had participated in a principally Western conflict, our allies and associates laid down for us laws of habitual hatred and fondness concerning eastern Europe. We responded by being obedient and trustful, like draft oxen under the yoke. The English and French had already developed the conception of Latin—Slavic co-operation against non-Slavs and non-Latins. The German-Austrians and the Magyars were neither Slavic nor Latin. Hence these two were treated as vanquished and guilty while the Slavs of Austria-Hungary were nominated victors, although with exceedingly few exceptions they had defended the Hapsburg Empire for four and a half years with no less fervour and tenacity than had the others. We Americans were ordered to love Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia and to applaud the ill-treatment meted out to Hungarians and German-Austrians. We did. We bowed reverently to the fact that one racially mixed community, Austria-Hungary, was replaced and absorbed by a number of states, three of which, namely Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania, were no less mixed than the dissected empire had been, whereas two states, Hungary and German-speaking Austria, suffered amputation of their best provinces.

I say we bowed to this settlement. To be quite exact, we did not care. The limited attention we gave to Europe hardly crossed the Rhine. If it suited the British and French to put millions of German-Austrians and Hungarians under Czech rule, Hungarians under Rumanian, and Croats under Serbian domination, why should we be squeamish?

But having helped our allies to win, we had our share of responsibility in the results of victory. We should not have washed our hands of all the injustice committed in the name of national self-determination, and yet we did. The fact that others, nearer to the spot, were no wiser than we may exculpate us, but it does not mean that we acted wisely. Peace treaties involve recognition of new factors that have been introduced by war; they also should involve a consulting together on the part of *all* the belligerents as to how best to set the world in working order again. Our desire to dictate the peace deprived us of much needed advice and criticism from experts among the countries most affected.

Even before Hitler shocked us into realizing our blunders, the truth had dawned upon some Americans who visited the dismembered empire. Businessmen, having visited first Croatia and then Serbia, or first Transylvania and then old Rumania, would ask me in bewilderment why advanced races had been put under the rule of comparatively backward ones. I could not find a satisfactory answer. Apparently in 1919 Christian statesmen had not yet discovered —as we now seem to have discovered— a method of chasing millions of provisionless people over the border without the slightest regard for family ties.

It is amazing how endurable have been those habitual hatreds and fondnesses produced in the First World War and then foisted on us by our allies. The explanation is propaganda — an amount of propaganda unthinkable at the time of Washington's warning. People deprived of their livelihood by their neighbors never even had a hearing. At the same time, those who profited by the victors' arbitrary discrimination showered us with an unceasing flow of propaganda. Especially does this refer to the Czechs, who took some of the best agricultural parts of Hungary and the richest industrial parts of German-speaking Austria. Many millions of dollars were spent every year in various kinds of propaganda — the object of which was to keep what had been seized.

All of this may sound like past history, outrun by events of incomparable magnitude. In reality it is living history. The

same habitual hatreds and fondnesses are still alive and have already begun to shackle us and to make us blind to our own interests. I am not speaking of Germany and Japan, although these are cases where a policy of permanent hatred would be the source of most fateful blundering. I am speaking of the eastern half of Europe which includes one half of central Europe.

Again as in 1919, we are asked to consider the Slavs our natural friends and the non-Slavs our natural enemies. But Slavism now means something quite different from what it meant after the other war. Then it referred to small and separate nations, to Poles, Czechs and Serbs. Now it refers to the largest continuous empire on earth, which, controlled by a dictator, stretched from the Pacific Ocean into the heart of Germany, having reduced to the position of satellites all the Slavic races which had not been under the scepter of the Czars — all Poland, Bohemia, Slovakia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Bulgaria. At the same time, we are expected to contribute, at least by acquiescence, to the chaining of those elements in the Soviet sphere which are non-Slav, principally Hungary, Rumania and German-speaking Austria.

With great foresight, Russian, Czech and southern Slav-communist propagandists, drawing from seemingly inexhaustible funds, prepared the ground for this policy before the Second World War ended in Europe. A shrewd distinction has been dinned into our ears — a distinction between Hitler's victims and his collaborators and satellites. How many Americans remember that Dr. Edouard Benes was swept out of office as President of Czechoslovakia by an irresistible wave of pro-German collaborationism which even rotted his own National Socialist Party, whose champions, Beran and Chvalkovsky, he had nominated as premier and foreign minister? How many remember that the Slovaks, described for twenty years as members of the one Czechoslovak race, sided with Hitler in his war against Russia and declared war on Poland and America? Very few, it is safe to say. But everyone seems to believe that "feudal and fascist Hungary" was Hitler's enthusiastic ally. Again, few remember that the Moscow Declaration, signed by us in 1943, reminded Austria, Hitler's first victim, of her responsibility in having participated in the war. The labels "victim", "collaborator" and "satellite" have even been interchangeable. As long as it suited Moscow, Bulgaria was called a satellite of Hitler. When she became a satellite of Russia, it was acknowledged that she had been Hitler's victim. The same happeded to Croatia.

It is undeniable fact that Hitler's best collaborators in the Second World War were the Czechs, the Slovaks and the Rumanians. Hungary held out longest against German demands, indeed, until the spring of 1944. Foreign propaganda, however, supported by our OWI, succeeded in distorting historic facts by telling our public that the regimes in Bohemia, Slovakia and Rumania were not representative of their peoples' wishes whereas the Hungarian regime was. This allegation is highly questionable.

Having been United States Minister to Hungary from 1933 to 1941, my regular post of observation in those critical years was Budapest. It was a unique post because the Magyars, neither Teuton nor Slav, were always aware of being between the two fires of German and Russian imperialism. During those years, most of us saw only one fire, the German one. Hungary's vision was far ahead of ours. Had we listened to Hungarian statesmen, we should perhaps have been able to limit Stalin's triumph in the hour of Hitler's fall.

Hungary, between the two wars, was a small country, and from my watchtower on the Danube my eyes could roam over her neighbors and neighbors' neighbors, over Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Germany and Italy. The Department of State encouraged my travel across many borders. Anticipating what I want to show in this book, I might say that what I witnessed was a tragic and insoluble conflict between fear and honour, in which fear was bound to win. It is an undeniable fact that on many occasions those who had been treated as stepchildren by the Western powers in 1919 showed more loyalty to the Allied cause than their spoiled favorites did.

Would it not have been better if we had opposed the arbitrary discrimination indulged in by the surgeons of 1919, who thereby afforded Hitler his most powerful arguments? Offered a second chance, we ought to set ourselves strongly and firmly against a repetition which this time would allow Slavic imperialism to run amuck.

(End of quotations from J. F. Montgomery's book).

The role of the Panslav factor

It is well known that in 1919 Rumania was reluctant for a long time to accept obligation for vested rights of the minorities to be included in the peace treaty. This is odd because it is typical of a Balkan state, of a Balkan nation that it makes no difference what they sign on any treaty, they act as they please as soon as they are in possession. This made Hungarians considerably uneasy, because they are well aware of the *morality of the Balkans* and of the practice of maltreating minorities and foreigners.

There is a well known historical reason for this. Byzantium was always in close contact with the absolutism of the Eastern peoples, the ideas of despotism derived from there.

In Byzantium they could never separate religion from Imperial politics. The religion began under the patronage of the emperor, interwoven with the empire, with the realm, with the political power. The Orthodox Church's servility derives from here. This situation has not changed during the last one and a half thousand years, it produced the *state-church* in all Orthodox countries, executing the power of government administration and supervision, almost as an organ of police. In such a political system, the clergy cannot progress and remains on a low level, the state does not develop either, life becomes rigid. This is the cause of the amazing primitiveness one notices when crossing the border of *Orthodoxia*.

In Balkan fashion, lies are considered virtue and to cheat someone is a glory. It would be a mistake to believe that these acts would cause some sort of remorse.

The Byzantines wanted to *dominate the world*. They elevated this *concept* to the rank of *messianism* in the Balkans and later in Russia, where the Greek Orthodox faith was gaining ground. Ever since, in the ethos of *Orthodoxia*, the East is the incarnation of morality, perfection, truth, it is itself the light, as opposed to the West, which is the nest of sin and decay. The West has to be conquered. In the New Testament the chosen

people are the Byzantines whose duty it is to guard the Orthodox faith and to prepare the redemption of humanity.

Professor Hans Kohn writes in his book *Pan-Slavism* (New York: Vintage Books 1960): "Khomyakov (1804—60) a leading Slavophile thinker was convinced by the events of 1848 that hope resided only in Orthodox Slavdom. He predicted in 1848 the end of Austria and of the last Charlemagne's Empire, and the disappearance of papal power *'in the archives of history, followed by Protestantism and by Catholicism... Now it is the turn of Orthodoxy, the turn of the Slav races to enter the stage of the world...'*."

In the East, religious ceremonies are held in each country's language. Today this sounds quite natural, but during the Middle Ages when the Church (of Rome) had a definite role in uniting and reconciling people, the Latin liturgy played a great part in making it possible for the Church to became universal and international, and without doubt, this lead to the development of *European spirituality*. In the Balkans the Greek-language Church was established and with its assistance the Gothic- the Armenian-, the Syrian-, the Coptic-, and the Slavic national Churches arose. However the uniting strength and authority over individual nations and churches was missing from this system.

The Orthodoxy in every country remained on the level of its surroundings due to its rigid isolation. Basically it cultivated *bold nationalism*, however in the early stages more accent was placed on religion than on language. This is well manifested in the historic Serb—Croat hostility, which also serves as a good example of the type of thousand year-long religious ground-conditioning which cannot dissolve even with the decline of the importance of religion.

The frontier of Western culture has stood for one thousand years alongside the southern and eastern borders of pre-Trianon Hungary. The Orthodox powers regarded Hungary as the main obstacle in their desire to introduce Orthodoxy into Europe. Every such effort has been halted at the gates of Hungary. This has been long forgotten in the West, and the greatest problem is that it is not felt in Europe that in the appearance of 19th century nationalism Orthodoxy in fact gained new momentum by the *Panslav Movement*.

"Panslavism in the first half of the nineteenth century was a movement of the Western Slavs born out of their cultural awakening and their political weakness. In the second half of the century it became a predominantly Russian movement, rooted in a feeling of spiritual and material grandeur and in a consciousness of historical destiny." (*Hans Kohn*).

The revolutionary nature of Slavophilism was pointed out by Prince Ivan Sergeyevich Gagarin (1814—82). In his pamphlet *La Russie sera-t-elle catholique?* (Paris 1856) he wrote: "In their foreign policy, they wished to fuse all Orthodox Christians of whatever nationality, and all Slavs of whatever religion, in a great political unity, in a great Slav and Orthodox empire..." (*Hans Kohn — Pan-Slavism*).

As a result of the Trianon Peace Treaty the Orthodox East (or by the Russian term the *Pravoslavs* — Real-Slavs) broke into the Carpathian Basin, actually into the *Occident* — fulfilling the long dream of the *Orient* — after many hundred years of trying.

In the middle of the Twentieth Century, led by Bolshevik Russia, Slav nationalism conquered Central Europe, but that was all it has achieved: it could not give more than what is its essence: hardly anything more than Byzantinism manifested as Bolshevism. The Slav "salvation of Europe" was foredoomed to failure, it compromised even the Panslav idea of unification of all Slavs. From the "Great Slav Orthodox Union" Yugoslavia deserted first, then Rumania and at the end of 1989 the Soviet Union itself collapsed, or more correctly, the Russian Empire fell apart.

The USSR did not deliver the glory of the Slavs, neither of Orthodoxy, nor that of the Russians. They lost everything they had gained with US help. The Slovaks are fed up with the Slav brotherhood of the Czechs. The Ukrainians do not appreciate the brotherhood of the Russians. The Serbs cast off the Catholic Croats ending the South-Slav Union (but certainly wanting to keep Croat and Hungarian territories).

Almost everything that was done against the order of nature, now returns to normal in the Eastern part of Europe except the division of the Carpathian Basin by the Peace Treaty of Trianon.

The Treaty of Trianon delivered one third of the Hungarian nation into the practice of the *liquidation of nations*. This slow but rather effective *"final solution"* is the product of the amalgamation of Byzantine-originated xenophobia, the incurable desire for territorial expansion of the Slavs and the "nation-state" ideology of French-origin. This creates a hopeless future for Hungarians now living in the Successor States.

For a long time now the issue has not been a dispute of the frontiers, nor any demands for minority rights. The issue is a large-scale cultural genocide which cannot be stopped by any international treaty or by the nowadays fashionable *bilateral "fundamental" pacts*.

None of these solutions will succeed because they are contrary to the very nature of the conquerors, and no treaty is respected by the partners anyway. Any treatment of the symptoms is worthless: the inherent cause, the source of the crime must be eliminated.

This problem cannot be handled between the interested parties, as it could not be handled during the past 75 years.

The Hungarians are not simply in quarrel with their neighbours, which can be ended by some mutual compromises. Hungary was attacked militarily in 1919 after the Armistice by the forces of the neighbouring countries with the assistance of the Great Powers. Seven neighbouring countries hold Hungarian-populated territories in captivity and they are not interested in settling the "quarrel", they are only interested in keeping Hungarian territories. They know very well, they can only keep the loot eternally if they clear the land of Hungarians. In this simple equation Hungary is not in a bargaining position, consequently there are no reasonable grounds for any bilateral treaty. The Hungarian people desire peace, but possess none of the elements required to achieve it. The Successor States are not interested in making sacrifices for the desired peace. That historical task should be assumed by the Great Powers who are responsible for creating this situation by imposing the Trianon Treaty 75 years ago and forcing Hungary to sign it on the sorrowful day of 4th June, 1920.

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Hungarian populated territories peacefully regained between 1938 and 1941. After the dissolution of the Czecho-Slovak State, Hungary recognized the first independent Slovak State (1939); Rumania agreed to return the northern part of Transylvania to Hungary (1940); Yugoslavia collapsed, Croatia become independent (1941).

This map shows an area of the Carpathian Basin (Historic Hungary) which now is in the possession of three Eastern (Orthodox-style) States: Ukraine, Rumania and Serbia. This nationally mixed area is suffering ethnic persecution and cultural genocide by its new host-states. The pacification of this land can only be achieved by the recognition of its own multicultural regional standing under an internationally guaranteed charter.